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states to estimate the impact of these law changes on crime through difference-in-difference and 
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show that these repeals led to a reduction in arrests for drug and alcohol consumption. 
Keywords: sodomy laws; LGBTQ; crime 
JEL: I18; J15; K14; K38 
  
 
1  Universidad Pontificia Comillas. E-mail: rciacci@icade.comillas.edu   
2  Vanderbilt University and University of Exeter. E-mail: dario.sansone@vanderbilt.edu  
2 
 
1. Introduction 
The sexual acts indicated as sodomy historically referred to both oral and anal sex, as well as 
bestiality. Sodomy laws are laws that criminalize these specific sexual activities. American 
colonies inherited these laws from the British Empire: sodomy was a crime punishable by death in 
most American colonies. Even after the U.S. declaration of independence and throughout the XX 
century, sodomy was a crime often punishable by a life sentence. The years after WWI were 
characterized by a real “gay panic”, a widespread belief that homosexuals were sexual predators 
targeting children and susceptible young adults to make them gay. Between 6,600 and 21,600 
people, mostly men, are estimated to have been arrested each year between 1946 and 1961 for non-
conforming gender or sexual behaviors. In the same period, tens of thousands of homosexuals were 
detained, blackmailed, or harassed by police officers (Eskridge 2008). In addition, sodomy laws 
were used against sexual minorities to limit their rights to adopt or raise children, to justify firing 
them, and to exclude them from hate-crime laws (ACLU 2019). Before the U.S. Supreme Court 
deemed sodomy laws unconstitutional in 2003 (Lawrence v. Texas), the penalty for violating 
sodomy laws ranged from a $500 fine in Texas to a maximum life sentence in Idaho (GLAPN 
2007).  
This paper extends an extremely limited literature on sodomy laws not only in economics, but also 
in public health and other social sciences. A few studies have looked at the determinants of sodomy 
laws (Frank, Camp, and Boutcher 2010; Asal, Sommer, and Harwood 2013), or at the effect of 
legalizing homosexuality across countries on attitudes toward sexual minorities (Kenny and Patel 
2017). To our knowledge, there is no study specifically looking at the impact of sodomy laws on 
crime. The empirical analysis exploits variation in the timing of decriminalization of same-sex 
sexual intercourse across U.S. states to estimate through difference-in-difference and event-study 
models. We provide the first evidence that the elimination of sodomy laws led to a persistent decline 
in the number of arrests for disorderly conduct, prostitution, and other sex offenses. In addition, 
we show that these repeals led to a reduction in arrests for drug and alcohol consumption. 
This paper contributes to two fields. First, within the literature on sexual minorities, this analysis 
is related to a growing number of studies estimating the impact of LGBT policies such as anti-
discrimination laws and same-sex marriage legalization on health and labor market outcomes (Dee 
2008; Francis, Mialon, and Peng 2012; Burn 2018; Carpenter et al. 2018; Sansone 2019). Second, 
this paper is linked to a strand of the literature in crime economics exploring the effect of family 
and vice laws (Stevenson and Wolfers 2006; Cáceres-Delpiano and Giolito 2012; Heaton 2012). 
Moreover, inside the field of crime economics, this paper is closely connected to recent empirical 
studies analyzing sex crimes and/or prostitution (Cunningham and Kendall 2011a; 2011b; Bhuller 
et al. 2013; Bisschop, Kastoryano, and van der Klaauw 2017; Cunningham and Shah 2018; Ciacci 
and Sviatschi 2019; Ciacci 2019). Yet, to the best of our knowledge this is the first paper to assess 
the link these two fields and to estimate the effect of LGBT policies on such crimes. 
More generally, this paper provides a new and important contribution to the literature on the 
economic effects of civil and social right reforms affecting stigmatized and marginalized 
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populations such as the Civil Right Act (J. J. I. Donohue and Heckman 1991; Hersch and Shinall 
2015), the legalization of interracial marriage (Fryer 2007), the Americans with Disabilities Act 
(Acemoglu and Angrist 2001; Hotchkiss 2004), abortion and family-planning reforms (J. J. 
Donohue and Levitt 2001; Goldin and Katz 2002; Bailey 2006; 2010), and the banning of sex 
discrimination in schools (Stevenson 2010).  
2. Institutional context underlying the econometric strategy 
Sodomy law decriminalization occurred in two ways: repeal through state legislatures and state 
supreme court decisions ruling the laws unconstitutional.3 Before 1980, the call for 
decriminalization was primarily made by legal experts trying to persuade states to modernize their 
criminal codes (Eskridge 2008). Illinois became the first state to decriminalize consensual sodomy 
in 1961. Connecticut did the same in 1969. Slowly, gay and lesbian movement activists, rather 
than legal experts, became responsible for initiating the attempts to decriminalize sodomy in the 
last two decades of the 20th century (Bernstein 2003). At the same time, there was also a shift in 
the primary policy venue used to challenge sodomy laws: as legal activist organizations 
specializing in judicial challenges began to lead the battle to decriminalize sodomy, they shifted 
the movement’s attention to the judicial system rather than the legislative arena. The move to the 
courts was largely based on the assumption that judges would be less influenced by public opinion 
than legislators would, which was particularly important as the federal and state legislatures 
entered the more conservative Reagan and Bush years (Clendinen and Nagourney, 1999; Kane, 
2007). Indeed, historically the U.S. Supreme court had already protect the right to distribute pro-
homosexual writing through the public mail service in 1958 (One Inc. v. Olesen), while at the same 
time the federal government was systematically firing during the so-called “Lavender Scare” 
thousands of U.S. government employees because they were suspected to be homosexual (Johnson 
2004). 
At the federal court level, the gay and lesbian movement attempted to decriminalize sodomy in the 
early 1980s through a challenge of the Georgia state sodomy law. The challenge reached the U.S. 
Supreme Court in 1986 (Bowers v. Hardwick). However, by a 5 to 4 decision, the Georgia law was 
found constitutional and the Court ruled that states had the right to criminalize specific sexual acts. 
Following this defeat, gay and lesbian activists started to challenge sodomy laws under state 
constitutions, which can add to rights guaranteed by the U.S. constitution. Thanks to this strategy, 
homosexuality was decriminalized in Kentucky in 1992 (Commonwealth v. Wasson), Tennessee 
in 1996 (Campbell v. Sundquist), and Montana in 1997 (Gryczan v. Montana). By the end of 2002, 
36 states plus the District of Columbia had decriminalized sodomy in their statutes (GLAPN, 2007; 
Eskridge, 2008). Finally, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled 6-3 that Texas’ sodomy law was 
unconstitutional (Lawrence v. Texas) on June 26, 2003, making all remaining sodomy laws invalid. 
  
 
3 Table A1 in the Online Appendix provides additional details on the chronology of sodomy laws decriminalization. 
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3. Data and methodology 
3.1 Data 
This paper uses the 1995-2018 Uniform Crime Reporting Program arrest database (FBI 2020).4 
This database collects arrest data for 28 offenses as reported from law enforcement agencies. Since 
a person might be arrested multiple times in the same year, this dataset measures the number of 
times persons are arrested rather than the number of individuals arrested.  
It is worth noting that the Uniform Crime Reporting Program arrest data set is based on voluntarily 
reporting by law enforcement agencies. This feature implies there might be the concern that crimes 
recorded by the database increase simply due to the number of law enforcement agencies that 
decide to report crimes. To address this issue, we keep track of the number of law enforcement 
agencies reporting crimes for each state in any year in our sample period. 
Table 1 shows summary statistics for our main dependent variables, i.e. arrest rate for disorderly 
conduct, prostitution, other sex offenses, and driving after consuming alcoholic beverages or using 
drugs ( per 1,000,000 residents, in logarithms).5 We can observe that for all four variables mean 
and median are fairly close to each other. As expected, arrests for prostitution and other sex 
offenses happen more rarely than arrests for disorderly conduct or for driving under the influence.6 
3.2 Event study model 
Given the available data and documented law changes, it is then possible to estimate the following 
event study:  
𝐴𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡 = 𝛼 + ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝑆𝑜𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑦𝑠𝑡
𝑘
𝑇
𝑘=𝑇
+ 𝛿𝑠 + 𝜇𝑡 + 𝑥𝑠𝑡
′ 𝛾1+𝐿𝐺𝐵𝑇𝑠𝑡
′ 𝛾2 + 𝜀𝑠𝑡   
where 𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑠𝑡 is the reported arrest rate (per 1,000,000 residents, in logarithms) for a given crime 
in state s at time t. 𝑆𝑜𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑦𝑠𝑡
0  is an indicator equal to one if state s had decriminalized sodomy at 
time t, zero otherwise.  𝑆𝑜𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑦𝑠𝑡
𝑘  are the resulting lead (𝑘 < 0) and lag (𝑘 > 0) operators. The 
specification includes state (𝛿𝑠) and year (𝜇𝑡) fixed effects. The vector of time-varying state-level 
controls (𝑥𝑠𝑡
′ ) includes unemployment rate, income per capita, and the number of agencies 
reporting their crime data to the FBI. In order to control for additional factors potentially related 
to sodomy laws, 𝐿𝐺𝐵𝑇𝑠𝑡
′  accounts for other policies such as constitutional and statutory bans on 
same-sex marriage, same-sex marriage legalization, same-sex domestic partnership legalization, 
same-sex civil union legalization, LGBTQ anti-discrimination laws, and LGBTQ hate crime laws. 
Standard errors are clustered at the state level (Bertrand et al., 2004). 
 
4 We are using all years whose complete arrest reports were available in the FBI UCR website (i.e.,1995-2018): 
https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s (Accessed: August/2020). 
5  All variables used in the empirical analysis are described in detail in Section B of the Online Appendix. 
6  In addition, Table C1 in the Online Appendix displays summary statistics for the number of agencies across states in the 
considered sample period. 
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3.3 Discussion on the exogeneity of the policy changes 
A key concern when interpreting difference-in-difference and event study estimates as causal is 
that the timing of the sodomy decriminalization in each state should not reflect pre-existing 
differences in state-level characteristics. In this context, it is important to emphasize that, unlike 
other policy reforms such as unilateral divorce laws (Stevenson and Wolfers 2006), sodomy laws 
in the 1990s and early 2000s – i.e., the law changes analyzed in our model - were struck down 
following judicial decisions, not legislative processes. The exact timing of the court decisions was 
plausibly unexpected. Moreover, judges often served lengthy terms and were less subject than 
politicians to the public opinion on homosexuality. Indeed, federal and state judges repealed these 
sodomy laws at the same time as voters and legislators in several states approved bans on same-
sex marriages (Sansone 2019), and while President Clinton and the U.S. Congress passed anti-
LGBT legislation such as and the Defense of Marriage Act defining marriage for federal purposes 
as the union of one man and one woman, as well as the Don’t ask, don’t tell policy barring openly 
gay, lesbian, or bisexual individuals from serving in the military. 
It is also worth mentioning that, even if one may worry that the most gay-friendly states were the 
first ones to introduce LGBTQ reforms such as the legalization of same-sex sexual activity and 
the introduction of marriage equality, this hypothesis is not supported by the fact that the order in 
which states decriminalized consensual sodomy is rather different from the order in which states 
legalized same-sex marriage. For instance, Massachusetts was the first state to legalize same-sex 
marriage (2004), but it was among the last ones to decriminalize sodomy (2002). New York, one 
of the states with the largest LGBTQ populations, was not among the first states to legalize sodomy 
(1980), nor same-sex marriage (2011).  
4. Results 
4.1 Sodomy law repeals lead to a reduction in arrest rates 
The key finding of the paper is that sodomy law repeals led to a significant and persistent reduction 
in the arrest rates for crimes directly related to sodomy. Indeed, Figure 1 shows a decline in arrests 
for sex offenses such as offenses against chastity, common decency, and morals. In line with 
(Ciacci 2019), Figures 2-3 reports similar reductions in arrests for prostitution and disorderly 
conduct (i.e., any behavior that tends to disturb the public peace or shock the public sense of 
morality) respectively. It is worth noting that, in all the graphs, none of the lead operators is 
statistically significant, thus supporting the parallel trends assumption. Moreover, the impact of 
decriminalizing sodomy on these crimes can be detected both in the year in which the law was 
abolished, as well as in the years afterwards, thus suggesting that these reforms had long-term 
effects. 
We then provide evidence supporting the hypothesis that sodomy law decriminalization not only 
led to a direct decline of individuals arrested for related crimes, but it also had more general effects. 
In line with the hypothesis that these law changes reduced minority stress (Meyer 1995) and led 
to a reduction of drinking and drug use as a coping mechanism, Figure 4 reports a clear and 
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significant drop in the number of arrests for driving while mentally or physically impaired as the 
result of consuming alcoholic beverages or using drugs. 
Table 2 reports the results from the difference-in-difference regression model for our four outcome 
variables (sex offenses, prostitution, disorderly conduct, and driving under the influence). In other 
words, the table reports the estimated β from the following difference-in-difference model:  
𝐴𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑆𝑜𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑦𝑠𝑡 +  𝛿𝑠 + 𝜇𝑡 + 𝑥𝑠𝑡
′ 𝛾1+𝐿𝐺𝐵𝑇𝑠𝑡
′ 𝛾2 + 𝜀𝑠𝑡  
where 𝑆𝑜𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑦𝑠𝑡 is an indicator equal to one if state s had decriminalized sodomy at time t, as 
well as in the following years, zero otherwise. The dependent variable (𝐴𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡), state fixed 
effects (𝛿𝑠), year fixed effects (𝜇𝑡), state controls (𝑥𝑠𝑡
′ ), and LGBT policy controls (𝐿𝐺𝐵𝑇𝑠𝑡
′ ) are 
defined as in the event study model. Results are negative and statistically significant in all four 
regressions, thus supporting the main conclusions from Figures 1-4.  
It is worth noting that our estimates are economically meaningful. According to Table 2, our 
findings suggest that sex offenses and prostitution rates decreased by roughly 16% and 37%, 
respectively, due to decriminalization of same-sex sexual intercourse. Likewise, disorderly 
conduct and driving under the influence respectively fell by about 25% each.  
4.2 Extensions and robustness checks 
The Online Appendix also reports several extensions and robustness checks. To further explore 
the event-study estimates, Columns 1 of Tables C2-C5 in the Online Appendix show the estimated 
coefficients shown in Figures 1-4. As also evident from these figures, most of the estimated effects 
or arrest rates in the years sodomy laws were repealed and afterwards are statistically significant 
at the 5 percent or 1 percent levels. In addition, following Borusyak and Jaravel (2018), Columns 
2-3 of such tables omit either 𝑆𝑜𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑦𝑠𝑡
−2 or 𝑆𝑜𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑦𝑠𝑡
−3, respectively. The last row of these two 
columns displays the p-value of the F-test of significance of the remaining lead operator: we find 
no statistical evidence suggesting that our results are driven by pre-trends. 
The main results do not change when measuring arrests in levels rather than logarithms (Figures 
C1-C4), when restricting the time frame (Figure C5-C8), or when increasing the number of leads 
and lags (Figure C9-C12). Excluding California – the state with the largest number of LGBT 
individuals – does not substantially alter the main findings (Figures C13-16). In line with the 
estimates plotted in Figure 4 measuring the impact of sodomy law repeals on arrest rate for driving 
after consuming alcoholic beverages or using drugs, we observe similar reductions in the number 
of arrests for drug abuse (Figure C17) and liquor laws violations (Figure C18). Finally, we show 
as placebo tests that sodomy law repeals had no impact on the number of arrests for gambling 
(Figure C19), burglary (Figure C20), or arson (Figure C21).  
5. Conclusions 
This paper has provided the first evidence that sodomy law repeals had an economic impact: they 
led to a reduction in the number of arrests due to sex offenses, prostitution, or disorderly conduct, 
as well as a decline in arrests linked to alcohol and drug consumption.  
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These findings are important from a policy perspective. Institutionalized homophobia is still 
prevalent worldwide: as of 2020, 70 countries have laws criminalizing homosexuality. In 11 of 
these countries, homosexuality is punishable by death (ILGA 2019). This study is a first step 
towards helping international institutions such as the World Bank or the European Union evaluate 
more accurately the costs and benefits of suspending foreign aids to countries in blatant violation 
of basic human rights (Economist 2014; Steer 2018). Furthermore, this analysis emphasizes the 
potential benefits from repealing sodomy laws still standing in several countries.  
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Figure 1: Effect of sodomy law repeals on arrests for sex offenses. 
 
This figure analyzes the effect of sodomy law repeals on the arrest rate for sex offenses (excluding rape, 
prostitution, and commercial vice). Arrest rate (per 1,000,000 state residents) is in logarithms. First lead 
normalized to zero. See also Data and Methodology Section. Source: FBI 1995-2018. N=1,189.  
Figure 2: Effect of sodomy law repeals on arrests for prostitution. 
 
This figure analyzes the effect of sodomy law repeals on the arrest rate (in logarithm) for prostitution and 
commercialized vice. See notes in Figure 1. Source: FBI 1995-2018. N=1,188.  
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Figure 3: Effect of sodomy law repeals on arrests for disorderly conduct. 
 
This figure analyzes the effect of sodomy law repeals on the arrest rate (in logarithm) for disorderly conduct. 
See notes in Figure 1. Source: FBI 1995-2018. N=1,179.  
Figure 4: Effect of sodomy law repeals on arrests for driving under the influence. 
 
This figure analyzes the effect of sodomy law repeals on the arrest rate (in logarithm) for driving after 
consuming alcoholic beverages or using drugs. See notes in Figure 1. Source: FBI 1995-2018. N=1,188.  
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics. 
 Mean St. Dev. Min Max Median 
Sex offenses 5.23 0.91 0 6.91 5.33 
Prostitution 4.58 1.50 0 8.01 4.86 
Disorderly conduct 7.40 1.09 0 9.82 7.54 
Driving under the influence  8.26 0.96 0 9.77 8.43 
This table displays descriptive statistics for the main dependent variables during the 
considered sample period. Source: FBI 1995-2018. 
 
Table 2: Effect of sodomy law repeals on sex offenses, prostitution, and disorderly conduct. 
Difference-in-difference. 
 
 Sex offenses Prostitution Disorderly conduct Driving under the influence 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Sodomy law repeal -0.170* -0.464** -0.277*** -0.297*** 
 (0.094) (0.176) (0.092) (0.079) 
State fixed effects     
Year fixed effects     
State control     
LGBT policies      
Observations 1,189 1,188 1,179 1,188 
Adjusted-R2 0.762 0.681 0.822 0.805 
This table analyzes the effect of sodomy law repeals on the arrest rate for sex offenses other than rape or prostitution 
(Column 1); prostitution and commercialized vice (Column 2); disorderly conduct (Column 3); and driving under the 
influence of alcohol or drugs (Column 4). Arrest rate (per 1,000,000 state residents) is in logarithms. Time-varying state-
level controls: unemployment rate, income per capita, and the number of agencies reporting their crime data to the FBI. 
LGBT policies: constitutional and statutory bans on same-sex marriage, same-sex marriage legalization, same-sex domestic 
partnership legalization, same-sex civil union legalization, LGBTQ anti-discrimination laws, and LGBTQ hate crime laws. 
Standard errors clustered at the state level reported in parenthesis. Source: FBI 1995-2018. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 
0.01  
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Appendix A. Institutional context underlying the econometric strategy 
Table A1: Sodomy law repeal before Lawrence v. Texas (2003). 
State Year Method Notes 
Illinois 1961 Legislative Enacted in 1961, effective in 1962 
Connecticut 1969 Legislative Enacted in 1969, effective in 1971 
Colorado 1971 Legislative Enacted in 1971, effective in 1972 
Oregon 1971 Legislative Enacted in 1971, effective in 1972 
Delaware 1972 Legislative Enacted in 1972, effective in 1973 
Hawaii 1972 Legislative Enacted in 1972, effective in 1973 
Ohio 1972 Legislative Enacted in 1972, effective in 1974 
North Dakota 1973 Legislative Enacted in 1973, effective in 1975 
California 1975 Legislative Enacted in 1975, effective in 1976 
Maine 1975 Legislative Enacted in 1975, effective in 1976 
New Hampshire 1975 Legislative Enacted in 1975, effective in 1975 
New Mexico 1975 Legislative Enacted in 1975, effective in 1975 
Washington 1975 Legislative Enacted in 1975, effective in 1976 
Indiana 1976 Legislative Enacted in 1976, effective in 1977 
Iowa 1976 Legislative Enacted in 1976, effective in 1978 
South Dakota 1976 Legislative Enacted in 1976, effective in 1977 
West Virginia 1976 Legislative Enacted in 1976, effective in 1976 
Nebraska 1977 Legislative Enacted in 1977, effective in 1978 
Vermont 1977 Legislative Enacted in 1977, effective in 1977 
Wyoming 1977 Legislative Enacted in 1977, effective in 1977 
Alaska 1978 Legislative Enacted in 1978, effective in 1980 
New Jersey 1978 Legislative Enacted in 1978, effective in 1979 
New York 1980 Judicial New York v. Onofre 
Pennsylvania 1980 Judicial Commonwealth v. Bonadio 
Wisconsin 1983 Legislative Enacted in 1983, effective in 1983 
Kentucky 1992 Judicial Commonwealth v. Wasson 
DC 1993 Legislative Enacted in 1993, effective in 1994 
Nevada 1993 Legislative Enacted in 1993, effective in 1993 
Tennessee 1996 Judicial Campbell v. Sundquist 
Montana 1997 Montana Gryczan v. Montana 
Georgia 1998 Judicial Powell v. Georgia 
Rhode Island 1998 Legislative Enacted in 1998, effective in 1998 
Maryland 1999 Judicial Williams v. Glendening 
Arizona 2001 Legislative Enacted in 2001, effective in 2001 
Minnesota 2001 Judicial Doe et al. v. Ventura et al. 
Arkansas 2002 Judicial Jegley v. Picado 
Massachusetts 2002 Judicial GLAD v. Attorney General 
Main Source: GLAPN (2007); Kane (2007); Eskridge (2008). 
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Appendix B. Variable description. 
B.1 Key variables. 
Number of arrests. The Uniform Crime Report (UCR) Program Data is a collection of agency-
level data published by the FBI. The FBI website reports complete UCR annual data for the years 
1995-2018.9 Because a person may be arrested multiple times during a year, the UCR arrest figures 
do not reflect the number of individuals who have been arrested; rather, the arrest data show the 
number of times that persons are arrested, as reported by law enforcement agencies to the UCR 
Program. We have analyzed the following crimes by dividing the number of reported arrests by 
the state population: 
• Prostitution and commercialized vice: unlawful promotion of or participation in sexual 
activities for profit. 
• Sex offenses (except rape, prostitution, and commercialized vice): Offenses against 
chastity, common decency, morals, and the like. 
• Disorderly conduct: any behavior that tends to disturb the public peace or decorum, 
scandalize the community, or shock the public sense of morality. 
• Driving under the influence: driving or operating a motor vehicle or common carrier while 
mentally or physically impaired as the result of consuming an alcoholic beverage or using 
a drug or narcotic. 
• Liquor laws: the violation of state or local laws or ordinances prohibiting the manufacture, 
sale, purchase, transportation, possession, or use of alcoholic beverages, not including 
driving under the influence and drunkenness. Federal violations are excluded. 
• Drug abuse violations: violation of laws prohibiting the production, distribution, and/or use 
of certain controlled substances. This includes the unlawful cultivation, manufacture, 
distribution, sale, purchase, use, possession, transportation, or importation of any 
controlled drug or narcotic substance. The following drug categories are specified: opium 
or cocaine and their derivatives (morphine, heroin, codeine); marijuana; synthetic 
narcotics, i.e. manufactured narcotics that can cause true addiction (Demerol, methadone); 
and dangerous nonnarcotic drugs (barbiturates, Benzedrine). 
• Burglary: the unlawful entry of a structure to commit a felony or theft. To classify an 
offense as a burglary, the use of force to gain entry need not have occurred. 
• Gambling: to unlawfully bet or wager money or something else of value; assist, promote, 
or operate a game of chance for money or some other stake; possess or transmit wagering 
information; manufacture, sell, purchase, possess, or transport gambling equipment, 
devices, or goods; or tamper with the outcome of a sporting event or contest to gain a 
gambling advantage. 
 
9 Source: https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/. Accessed: Mar/1/2020 
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• Arson: any willful or malicious burning or attempting to burn, with or without intent to 
defraud, a dwelling house, public building, motor vehicle or aircraft, personal property of 
another, etc. 
Population records the estimates of the civilian noninstitutional population ages 16 and older 
computed by the Census Bureau.10 
Sodomy law repeal is an indicator variable equal to one in all states and time periods in which 
sodomy laws regarding same-sex sexual activities (both oral and anal sex) had been 
repealed\decriminalized; zero otherwise. This variable has been set equal to one even in cases 
when a state or federal Supreme Court had found sodomy laws unconstitutional, although sodomy 
laws were still included in the state statute, since they were inapplicable. The enactment date has 
been used to code this variable (as shown in Table A1, all sodomy laws repealed in the time frame 
considered in the main analysis, i.e. 1995-2018, have the effective date in the same years as the 
enactment date). Whenever noted, some minor variations of this variables have been used in the 
event studies and difference-in-difference models. These data have been primarily obtained from 
the Gay and Lesbian Archives of the Pacific Northwest.11 
B.2 State-level controls. 
Number of agencies records in each year and state the number of agencies that reported their crime 
statistics to the UCR. 
Unemployment rate records the state-month unemployment rates for the civilian noninstitutional 
population ages 16 and older, not seasonally adjusted as computed from the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics.12 From this, we have computed the average unemployment rate in each state. 
Income per capita records the state-year personal income, not seasonally adjusted. The data have 
been retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.13 
B.3 LGBT policy variables. 
SSM legal is an indicator variable equal to one in all states and time periods when same-sex 
marriage was legal; zero otherwise. The effective date has been used to code this variable. These 
data have been primarily obtained from the National Center for Lesbian Rights.14 
SSM ban is a series of indicator variables equal to one in all states and time periods in which same-
sex marriage was banned in the state constitution or state statute; zero otherwise. These indicators 
remain equal to one even in later years after the legalization of same-sex marriage in a given state. 
When more than one statutory ban was passed in a state, the oldest one has been used to code the 
 
10 Source: https://www.bls.gov/lau/rdscnp16.htm. Accessed: Oct/1/2019. 
11 Source: https://www.glapn.org/sodomylaws/usa/usa.htm. Accessed Oct/1/2019. 
12 Source: https://www.bls.gov/lau/rdscnp16.htm. Accessed: Oct/1/2019. 
13 Applied filters: income; not seasonally adjusted, per capita, state. Source: https://fred.stlouisfed.org/. Accessed: Oct/25/2019 
14 Source: http://www.nclrights.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/Relationship-Recognition.pdf. Accessed Oct/1/2019. 
17 
 
state statute ban variable. These data have been primarily obtained from the Freedom to Marry 
campaign.15 
Domestic partnership is an indicator variable equal to one in all states and time periods in which 
same-sex domestic partnerships were legal; zero otherwise. This indicator remains equal to one 
even in later years when\if a state had converted same-sex domestic partnerships into marriages. 
These data have been primarily obtained from the National Center for Lesbian Rights.16 
Civil union is an indicator variable equal to one in all states and time periods in which same-sex 
civil unions were legal; zero otherwise. This indicator remains equal to one even in later years 
when\if a state had converted same-sex civil unions in marriages. These data have been primarily 
obtained from the National Center for Lesbian Rights.17 
Anti-discrimination law is an indicator equal to one in all states and time periods in which employer 
discrimination based on sexual orientation was not allowed; zero otherwise. This variable has been 
set equal to one even if the law covered only sexual orientation, not gender identity, or if a law 
protecting trans individuals was passed at a later date. Laws protecting only public employees have 
not been considered. These data have been primarily obtained from the Freedom for All Americans 
campaign.18 
Hate crime is a series of indicator variables equal to one in all states and time periods in which 
there was a law specifically addressing hate or bias crimes based on sexual orientation only, or on 
sexual orientation and gender identity; zero otherwise. Since some states passed these laws after 
2009, these variables have not been set equal to one for all states after President Obama signed the 
Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act into law on October 28, 2009. 
These data have been primarily obtained from the Human Rights Campaign.19 
  
 
15 Source: http://www.freedomtomarry.org/pages/winning-in-the-states. Accessed Oct/1/2019. 
16 Source: http://www.nclrights.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/Relationship-Recognition.pdf. Accessed Oct/1/2019. 
17  Source: http://www.nclrights.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/Relationship-Recognition.pdf. Accessed Oct/1/2019. 
18 Source: https://www.freedomforallamericans.org/states/.Accessed: Oct/21/2019. 
19 Source: https://www.hrc.org/state-maps/hate-crimes. Accessed: Oct/25/2019. 
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Appendix C. Additional tables and figures. 
Figure C1: Effect of sodomy law repeals on arrests for sex offenses (in levels). 
 
This figure analyzes the effect of sodomy law repeals on the arrest rate (in levels) for sex offenses (excluding 
rape, prostitution, and commercial vice). See also notes in Figure 1. Source: FBI 1995-2018. N=1,189.  
Figure C2: Effect of sodomy law repeals on arrests for prostitution (in levels). 
 
This figure analyzes the effect of sodomy law repeals on the arrest rate (in levels) for prostitution and 
commercialized vice. See also notes in Figure 1. Source: FBI 1995-2018. N=1,188.  
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Figure C3: Effect of sodomy law repeals on arrests for disorderly conduct (in levels). 
 
This figure analyzes the effect of sodomy law repeals on the arrest rate (in levels) for disorderly conduct. See 
also notes in Figure 1. Source: FBI 1995-2018. N=1,179.  
Figure C4: Effect of sodomy law repeals on arrests for driving under the influence (in levels). 
 
This figure analyzes the effect of sodomy law repeals on the arrest rate (in levels) for driving after consuming 
alcoholic beverages or using drugs. See notes in Figure 1. Source: FBI 1995-2018. N=1,188.  
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Figure C5: Effect of sodomy law repeals on arrests for sex offenses (1995-2010). 
 
This figure analyzes the effect of sodomy law repeals on arrest rate (in logarithm) for sex offenses (excluding 
rape, prostitution, and commercial vice). See also notes in Figure 1. Source: FBI 1995-2010. N=784.  
Figure C6: Effect of sodomy law repeals on arrests for prostitution (1995-2010). 
 
This figure analyzes the effect of sodomy law repeals on the arrest rate (in logarithm) for prostitution and 
commercialized vice. See also notes in Figure 1. Source: FBI 1995-2010. N=783.  
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Figure C7: Effect of sodomy law repeals on arrests for disorderly conduct (1995-2010). 
 
This figure analyzes the effect of sodomy law repeals on the arrest rate (in logarithm) for disorderly conduct. 
See also notes in Figure 1. Source: FBI 1995-2010. N=774.  
Figure C8: Effect of sodomy law repeals on arrests for driving under the influence (1995-
2010). 
 
This figure analyzes the effect of sodomy law repeals on the arrest rate (in logarithm) for driving after 
consuming alcoholic beverages or using drugs. See notes in Figure 1. Source: FBI 1995-2010. N=783.  
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Figure C9: Effect of sodomy law repeal on arrests for sex offenses. Add leads and lags. 
 
This figure analyzes the effect of sodomy law repeals on the arrest rate (in logarithm) for sex offenses 
(excluding rape, prostitution, and commercial vice). See also notes in Figure 1. Source: FBI 1995-2018. 
N=1,189.  
Figure C10: Effect of sodomy law repeals on arrests for prostitution. Add leads and lags. 
 
This figure analyzes the effect of sodomy law repeals on the arrest rate (in logarithm) for prostitution and 
commercialized vice. See also notes in Figure 1. Source: FBI 1995-2018. Source: FBI 1995-2018. N=1,188.  
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Figure C11: Effect of sodomy law repeals on arrests for disorderly conduct. Add leads and 
lags. 
 
This figure analyzes the effect of sodomy law repeals on the arrest rate (in logarithm) for disorderly conduct. 
See also notes in Figure 1. Source: FBI 1995-2018. N=1,179.  
Figure C12: Effect of sodomy law repeals on arrests for driving under the influence. Add 
leads and lags. 
 
This figure analyzes the effect of sodomy law repeals on the arrest rate (in logarithm) for driving after 
consuming alcoholic beverages or using drugs. See notes in Figure 1. Source: FBI 1995-2018. N=1,188.  
  
24 
 
Figure C13: Effect of sodomy law repeal on arrests for sex offenses. Exclude California. 
 
This figure analyzes the effect of sodomy law repeals on the arrest rate (in logarithm) for sex offenses 
(excluding rape, prostitution, and commercial vice). See also notes in Figure 1. Source: FBI 1995-2018. 
N=1,165.  
Figure C14: Effect of sodomy law repeals on arrests for prostitution. Exclude California. 
 
This figure analyzes the effect of sodomy law repeals on the arrest rate (in logarithm) for prostitution and 
commercialized vice. See also notes in Figure 1. Source: FBI 1995-2018. Source: FBI 1995-2018. N=1,164.  
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Figure C15: Effect of sodomy law repeals on arrests for disorderly conduct. Exclude 
California. 
 
This figure analyzes the effect of sodomy law repeals on the arrest rate (in logarithm) for disorderly conduct. 
See also notes in Figure 1. Source: FBI 1995-2018. N=1,155.  
Figure C16: Effect of sodomy law repeals on arrests for driving under the influence. Exclude 
California. 
 
This figure analyzes the effect of sodomy law repeals on the arrest rate (in logarithm) for driving after 
consuming alcoholic beverages or using drugs. See notes in Figure 1. Source: FBI 1995-2018. N=1,164.  
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Figure C17: Effect of sodomy law repeals on arrests for drug abuse. 
 
This figure analyzes the effect of sodomy law repeals on the arrest rate (in logarithm) for drug 
abuse violations. See also notes in Figure 1. Source: FBI 1995-2018. N=1,189.  
Figure C18: Effect of sodomy law repeals on arrests for liquor law violations. 
 
This figure analyzes the effect of sodomy law repeals on the arrest rate (in logarithm) for liquor 
law violations. See also notes in Figure 1. Source: FBI 1995-2018. N=1,189.  
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Figure C19: Effect of sodomy law repeals on arrests for gambling. 
 
This figure analyzes the effect of sodomy law repeals on the arrest rate (in logarithm) for 
gambling. See also notes in Figure 1. Source: FBI 1995-2018. N=1,186.  
Figure C20: Effect of sodomy law repeals on arrests for burglary. 
 
This figure analyzes the effect of sodomy law repeals on the arrest rate (in logarithm) for burglary. 
See also notes in Figure 1. Source: FBI 1995-2018. N=1,189.  
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Figure C21: Effect of sodomy law repeals on arrests for arson. 
 
This figure analyzes the effect of sodomy law repeals on the arrest rate (in logarithm) for arson. 
See also notes in Figure 1. Source: FBI 1995-2018. N=1,189.  
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Table C1: Number of agencies, descriptive statistics. 
 Mean St. Dev. Min Max Median 
Alaska 223.13 107.34 1 344 266.50 
Alabama 29.08 3.90 19 35 30 
Arkansas 83.75 7.08 67 98 84 
Arizona 191.04 47.65 93 271 186.50 
California 666.04 29.23 602 700 679.50 
Colorado 173.67 25.73 125 208 180 
Connecticut 94.88 7.84 74 105 96.50 
District of Columbia 48.75 11.66 1 62 52 
Delaware 1.50 0.52 1 2 1.50 
Florida 596.95 52.81 475 678 595.50 
Georgia 294.63 101.02 75 422 290.50 
Hawaii 2.91 1.19 1 5 3 
Iowa 100.75 10.84 71 117 102.50 
Idaho 1.57 0.51 1 2 2 
Illinois 158.08 36.55 102 243 155 
Indiana 185.96 10.90 154 206 190 
Kansas 222.47 16.83 183 248 225 
Kentucky 160.75 168.33 3 419 29.50 
Louisiana 130.25 24.40 86 170 130.50 
Massachusetts 164.13 17.50 119 195 164 
Maryland 144 7.03 129 154 144.50 
Maine 293.71 30.45 239 342 301.50 
Michigan 532.54 51.72 421 614 535.50 
Minnesota 316.50 32.24 260 378 319 
Missouri 76.67 16.58 41 101 77 
Mississippi 317.46 127.43 132 580 354 
Montana 76.80 22.51 34 100 89.50 
North Carolina 198.46 43.21 54 237 212.50 
North Dakota 32.83 9.93 3 51 32 
Nebraska 128.50 37.43 40 184 132 
New Hampshire 519.79 26.43 473 577 527.50 
New Jersey 52.17 16.98 22 87 52.50 
New Mexico 487.96 73.40 330 628 505.50 
Nevada 338.46 73.61 204 463 337.50 
New York 74.54 20.46 44 106 70 
Ohio 354.63 74.29 231 461 358 
Oklahoma 302.83 33.10 256 400 296 
Oregon 146.50 22.52 101 194 144.50 
Pennsylvania 905.83 329.88 1 1,383 885.50 
Rhode Island 45.83 2.33 41 49 46.50 
South Carolina 286.96 123.73 82 479 262.50 
South Dakota 83.54 29.34 23 120 87 
Tennessee 347.54 121.26 93 460 393.50 
Texas 935.50 50.07 839 1,020 944 
Utah 101.88 14.78 79 125 104.50 
Virginia 59.59 16.55 18 78 65.50 
Vermont 341.33 40.88 260 410 342.50 
Washington 208.96 14.49 177 229 210 
Wisconsin 230.13 63.44 126 347 248 
West Virginia 326 92.85 3 427 342 
Wyoming 57.71 7.40 31 65 61 
This table displays descriptive statistics for the number of agencies in each 
state during the sample period. Source: FBI 1995-2018. 
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Table C2: Effect of sodomy law repeals on arrests for sex offenses. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Time sodomy law repeal = -3 and earlier -0.0292 0.00609  
 (0.101) (0.0898)  
Time sodomy law repeal = -2 -0.0724  -0.0497 
 (0.0923)  (0.0897) 
Time sodomy law repeal = 0 -0.258** -0.224** -0.236** 
 (0.110) (0.100) (0.117) 
Time sodomy law repeal = +1 -0.208** -0.175** -0.186 
 (0.0987) (0.0834) (0.124) 
Time sodomy law repeal = +2 -0.0827 -0.0481 -0.0603 
 (0.156) (0.170) (0.194) 
Time sodomy law repeal = +3 and later -0.207** -0.173 -0.186* 
 (0.101) (0.108) (0.111) 
State fixed effects    
Year fixed effects    
LGBT policies    
State control    
Observations 1,189 1,189 1,189 
F-test (p-value)  0.946 0.582 
See notes in Figure 1 and Table 1. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table C3: Effect of sodomy law repeals on arrests for prostitution. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Time sodomy law repeal = -3 and earlier -0.0860 -0.0193  
 (0.196) (0.194)  
Time sodomy law repeal = -2 -0.137  -0.0701 
 (0.212)  (0.224) 
Time sodomy law repeal = 0 -0.438* -0.374 -0.374 
 (0.261) (0.259) (0.232) 
Time sodomy law repeal = +1 -0.625** -0.562** -0.561** 
 (0.304) (0.247) (0.266) 
Time sodomy law repeal = +2 -0.0217 0.0437 0.0444 
 (0.381) (0.398) (0.375) 
Time sodomy law repeal = +3 and later -0.641*** -0.577** -0.578** 
 (0.228) (0.232) (0.231) 
State fixed effects    
Year fixed effects    
LGBT policies    
State control    
Observations 1,188 1,188 1,188 
F-test (p-value)  0.921 0.756 
See notes in Figure 1 and Table 1. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table C4: Effect of sodomy law repeals on arrests for disorderly conduct. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Time sodomy law repeal = -3 and earlier 0.0444 0.0814  
 (0.0879) (0.0823)  
Time sodomy law repeal = -2 -0.0761  -0.111 
 (0.0682)  (0.0784) 
Time sodomy law repeal = 0 -0.295*** -0.259** -0.328** 
 (0.101) (0.101) (0.123) 
Time sodomy law repeal = +1 -0.298** -0.263** -0.332** 
 (0.113) (0.108) (0.134) 
Time sodomy law repeal = +2 -0.121 -0.0848 -0.155 
 (0.152) (0.160) (0.178) 
Time sodomy law repeal = +3 and later -0.273*** -0.238** -0.306*** 
 (0.0973) (0.0989) (0.108) 
State fixed effects    
Year fixed effects    
LGBT policies    
State control    
Observations 1,179 1,179 1,179 
F-test (p-value)  0.327 0.164 
See notes in Figure 1 and Table 1. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table C5: Effect of sodomy law repeals on arrests for driving under the influence. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Time sodomy law repeal = -3 and earlier 0.0614 0.0533  
 (0.0799) (0.0710)  
Time sodomy law repeal = -2 0.0166  -0.0311 
 (0.0463)  (0.0554) 
Time sodomy law repeal = 0 -0.177** -0.185** -0.223** 
 (0.0847) (0.0886) (0.109) 
Time sodomy law repeal = +1 -0.260*** -0.268*** -0.306** 
 (0.0929) (0.0990) (0.123) 
Time sodomy law repeal = +2 -0.115 -0.123 -0.162 
 (0.204) (0.203) (0.210) 
Time sodomy law repeal = +3 and later -0.299*** -0.307*** -0.345*** 
 (0.0858) (0.0837) (0.0889) 
State fixed effects    
Year fixed effects    
LGBT policies    
State control    
Observations 1,188 1,188 1,188 
F-test (p-value)  0.456 0.577 
See notes in Figure 1 and Table 1. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
